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Reading The National Tribune is as enjoyable as attending a Campfire. Beside every issue contains suggestions and information of practical benefit to comrades.

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.

BATTLE OF ATLANTA.

The Terrible Struggle of July 22, 1864—Hood's Desperate Attempt to Turn Sherman's Left, and Drive Him Back from Atlanta.

By Maj-Gen. GRENVILLE M. DODGE, Commander, Sixteenth Corps.

On the 17th day of July, 1864, Gen. John B. Hood relieved Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Confederate army in front of Atlanta, and on the 20th Hood opened an attack upon Sherman's right, commanded by Gen. Thomas. The attack was a failure, and resulted in a great defeat to Hood's army and the disarrangement of all his plans.

On the evening of the 21st of July Gen. Sherman's army had closed up to within two miles of Atlanta, and on that day Force's Brigade of the Fifteenth Corps, which had been ordered to occupy the line of the Atlanta and Marietta Railroad, carried a prominent hill known as Bald or Leggett's Hill, which gave us a clear view of Atlanta, and placed that city within range of our guns. It was a strategic point, and unless the swing of our left was stopped it would dangerously interfere with Hood's communications towards the south. Hood fully appreciated this, and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of Gen. Sherman's army.

On the 22nd of July the Army of the Tennessee was occupying the rebel intrenchments, its right resting very near the Howard House, south of the Augusta Railroad, thence to Leggett's Hill, which had been captured by Force's Brigade on the evening of the 21st. From this hill Gen. S. M. Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Corps stretched out southward on a road that occupied this ridge with a weak flank of air. To strengthen this flank, by order of Gen. McPherson I sent on the evening of the 21st one brigade of Fuller's Division, the other being left at Decatur to protect our parked trains. Fuller's Brigade, which numbered about half a mile in the rear of the extreme left and at right angles to Blair's lines, and commanding the open ground and valley of the ridge, was the only one of the line that proved very strong in the battle. Fuller did not go into line; simply bivouacked, ready to respond to any call.

On the morning of the 22nd of July Gen. McPherson called at my headquarters, and gave me verbal orders in relation to the movement of the Second (Sweeney's) Division of my (the Sixteenth) Corps, which had been crowded out of the line by the contraction of our lines as we neared Atlanta, and told me that I was to take command of the left of the line that Blair had been instructed to occupy and defend that morning, and cautioned me about protecting my flank very strongly. McPherson evidently thought that there would be trouble on that flank, for he rode out to examine it himself.

I moved Sweeney in the rear of our army, on the road leading from the Augusta Railroad, down the east branch of Sugar Creek to near where it forks. Then turning west, the road crosses the west branch of Sugar Creek just back where Fuller was camped, and passed up through a strip of woods and through Blair's lines near where his left was refused. Up this road Sweeney marched until he reached Fuller, when he halted, waiting until the line I had selected on Blair's position was well entrenched, so that at mid-day, July 22, the position of the Army of the Tennessee was as follows: One division of the Fifteenth Corps, and the balance of the Fifteenth and all of the Seventeenth Corps behind intrenchments running south of the railroad along a gentle ridge with a level top and a clear valley facing Atlanta in front, and another clear valley in the rear. The Sixteenth Corps was resting on the ridge described, entirely in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps, and facing Blair's line from Atlanta. To the left and right the country was heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore, was enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach close to the rear of our lines.

On the night of July 21st Hood had transferred Hardee's Corps and two divisions of Wheeler's Cavalry to our rear, going around our left flank. Wheeler attacking Sprague's Corps, Sixteenth Corps, at Decatur, where our trains were parked. At daylight Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps and the Georgia militia were withdrawn closer to Atlanta, and in a position to attack simultaneously with Hardee's Corps, thus involving the destroying of the Army of the Tennessee by attacking it in rear and front, and the capturing of all its trains.

On the morning of the 22nd of July, the plan of attack so that his left was to strike the Seventeenth Corps. He was to swing his right until he enveloped and attacked the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps.

Hood stood in one of the batteries of Atlanta, where he could see Blair's left and the front line of the Fifteenth Corps. He says he was astonished to see the attack come on Blair's left instead of his rear, and charges his defeat to that fact; but Hardee's Corps swung his right and came out in the open found the Sixteenth Corps in line in the rear of our army, and he was as much surprised to find us there as our army was that the sudden attack in our rear. The driving back by the Sixteenth Corps of Hardee's Corps made his Corps drift to the left and into Blair's line, and Blair's left flank was into his rear, so that what Hood declares was the cause of his failure was not Hardee's fault, as his attacks on the Sixteenth Corps were evidently determined and fierce enough to relieve him from all blame in that matter.

Historians and others who have written of the battle of Atlanta have been misled by being governed in their data by the first dispatches of Gen. Sherman, who was evidently misinformed, as he afterwards corrected his dispatch. He stated in the first dispatch that the attack was made on Blair's Corps, and also that Gen. McPherson was killed about 11 a. m. The fact is, Blair was not attacked until half an hour after the attack upon the Sixteenth Corps, and McPherson fell at about 2 p. m. Gen. Sherman was at the Howard House, which was miles away from the scene of Hardee's attack in the rear, and evidently did not at first comprehend the terrible fighting that was in progress, and the serious results that would have been effected had the attack succeeded.

The battle began at 12 o'clock or 20 minutes of 12 o'clock (noon) and lasted until 4 p. m. The Army of the Tennessee had present on that day 26,000 men; in the Fifteenth Corps, 26,000 men; in the Sixteenth Corps, 9,000 in the Seventeenth Corps, and 7,000 in the Eighteenth Corps. Three brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were absent, the Six-

teenth Corps having 5,000 men in a single line, which received the attack of the three divisions of Hardee's Corps, Hardee's left, Cleburne's Division lapping the extreme left of Blair, and joining Cheatham's Corps, which attacked Blair from the Atlanta front, and according to Hood they were joined by the Georgia Militia under Gen. Smith, extending down the line in front of the Army of Ohio and Cumberland; Stewart's Corps occupied the works and held the lines in front of the Army of Cumberland. The Sixteenth Corps fought in the open ground, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth behind intrenchments.

Where I stood, just at the rear of the Sixteenth Corps, I could see the entire line of the Army of the Tennessee, and the enemy's entire front as they emerged from the woods, and I quickly saw that both of my flanks were overtopped by the enemy.

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mental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although the movement was covered by a heavy and well-directed fire from artillery which was posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which enabled the guns to shoot our troops with solid shot and shell, firing over the attacking column.

"It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, deadly fire from Fuller's Division, the Sixteenth Corps, and the guns of the 14th Ohio and Welker's batteries of the Sixteenth Corps fairly mowed great swaths in the advancing column. They showed great steadiness, and closed up the gaps and preserved their alignments; but the iron and leaden hail which was poured upon them was too much for flesh and blood to stand, and before reaching the center of the open field the columns were broken up and thrown into great confusion. Taking advantage of this, Dodge, with portions of Fuller's and Sweeney's Divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners.

"Gen. McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and determined bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. Gen. Dodge held the key to the position. "Had the Sixteenth Corps given way, the rebel army would have been in the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army of the Tennessee would have been critical, although, without doubt, the result of the battle would have been in our favor, because the Armies of the Cumberland and Ohio were close at hand, and the enemy would have been checked and routed further on."

Gen. Blair in his official report of the battle says: "I witnessed the first furious assault upon the Sixteenth Corps, and its prompt repulse. It was a most fortunate circumstance that for whole army that the Sixteenth Corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe, at the moment of the attack, and although it does not seem to me to commend upon the brave conduct of the officers and men of that corps, still I can not refrain from expressing my admiration for the manner in which the Sixteenth Corps met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy."

THE SIXTEENTH CORPS' PROUD RECORD. The Sixteenth Corps has a record in that battle which we seldom see in the annals of war. It met the shock of battle and the fire of the shot and shell that night, as the enemy stubbornly yielded only by the aid of the Sixteenth Corps. It fought on four parts of the field, and everywhere with equal success; it lost no gun that it took into the engagement, and its losses were nearly equal to the enemy's. Their captures represented 49 different regiments of the enemy. How rare the fact that this small force, technically, if not actually, in march, in a perfectly open field, with this enormous superiority of force, was able to hold its ground and drive its assailants, pell-mell, back to the cover of the woods again, proves that when a great battle is fought, and a great emergency occurs, no officer can tell what the result may be when he throws in his forces, be they 5,000 or 20,000 men; and it seems to me to be impossible to draw the line that gives the right to a subordinate officer to use his own judgment in engaging an enemy when a great battle is within his hearing.

Suppose the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing at least three times their number in their front, should have retreated instead of standing and fighting as it did, what would have been the result? I say that in all my experience in life, until two forces struck and the Sixteenth Corps stood firm, I never passed more anxious moments.

SPRAGUE'S BRIGADE. Of the same Corps, was engaged at the same time within hearing, but on a different field, at Decatur, fighting and stubbornly holding that place, knowing that if he failed he would have been the next day at Roswell would be captured. His fight was a gallant and sometimes, seemingly almost hopeless one—giving ground inch by inch, until, finally, he obtained a position that could not be driven from, and one that protected the entire trains of the army.

As Hardee's attack fell upon the Sixteenth Corps, his left division (Cleburne's) lapped over and beyond Blair's left, and swung around his left front; they poured down through the gap between the left of the Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth Corps, taking Blair in front, Gen. Giles A. Smith commanded Blair's left division, his right connecting with Leggett at Bald Hill, where Leggett's Division held the line until they connected with the

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Fifteenth Corps, and along this front the battle raged with great fury.

Cleburne's Division, along the open space between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps they cut off from Blair's left and captured a portion of two regiments of the Sixteenth Corps, and forced the Seventeenth Corps to form new lines, utilizing the old intrenchments thrown up by the enemy, fighting first on one side and then on the other, as the attack would come from Hardee in the rear or Cheatham in the front, until about 3:30 p. m., when, evidently after a full, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to wipe out Giles A. Smith's Division and capture Leggett's Hill, the enemy approaching under cover of the woods until they were within 50 yards of Smith's temporary position, when they pressed forward until the fight became a hand-to-hand conflict across the trenches occupied by Smith, the troops using the bayonet freely and the officers their swords. This attack failed; it was no doubt intended to occur at the same time that Cheatham's Corps attacked from the Atlanta front, which Leggett met. The brutal Cheatham's Division, and the news was waited from day to day with interest so intense as to be almost sickening.

A better field could not be selected for the first of the grand maneuvers and drills which are intended for the instruction of the Regular Army and National Guard of the country in the science of war. It is the first time that the Government has attempted to do a thing like this, which is considered vitally necessary in this era of great armies. The force which will be assembled, though only 30,000 men, is very much larger and ever brought together before, except for actual conflict.

Undoubtedly the maneuvers will be fruitful of immense good outside of the instruction in the art of war. Troops will be brought together from sections as remote from one another as Connecticut and Texas. The intermingling of citizen soldiers from such widely separated parts of the country, with the same ideas, aspirations, ideals, and high standards of patriotism. The Plains of Manassas are an ideal maneuvering ground. They are large enough to admit all of the most varied movements of great bodies of men, and are sufficiently diversified in character to bring out the most varied features of strategy and tactics.

THE TERRAIN. On the west is the range of the Bull Run Mountains, with the much higher wall of the Blue Ridge and many gaps, affording widest opportunities for successful flanking movements.

The first great feature south of Washington is the line of the Potomac, or more familiarly Bull Run. Cedar Run, Broad Run and Bull Run—all considerable creeks, unite to form the Occoquan River, which empties into the Potomac some 25 miles below Washington, and with its high, steep banks make a strong line of defense. Their passage is everywhere more or less difficult, and must be strongly guarded in any movement of bodies of troops.

From 30 to 40 miles still farther south is the still stronger line of the Rappahannock, with its important tributary, the Rapidan. This section—extending some 65 miles, or a little more, due south from Washington—and extending from the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah Valley eastward to the Potomac, with its breadth, cut across by the Rappahannock and Occoquan and their tributaries—was the theater of operations of the two great Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia from the beginning of the war, until the two forged over toward the James in the bloody grappling begun in the Wilderness when the war was three years old.

In the maneuvers a great many of the movements of those eventful days will be repeated for the instruction of the troops of the Regular Army, and the consequences of a review of some of the principal events will be useful and timely in order to comprehend better the meaning of the operations which are to be executed.

THE IMPORTANCE of the Plains of Manassas during the war of the rebellion consisted in their being the theatre of the most important military operations of the war. They were the scene of the great battles of the Potomac and Northern Virginia, and the decisive movements of the war were made there. They were the scene of the great battles of the Potomac and Northern Virginia, and the decisive movements of the war were made there.

(Continued on sixth page.)

THE HISTORIC PLAINS OF MANASSAS.

Practice Ground To-Day That Once Shook With the Fierce Encounters of Armed Myriads.

Opening of the War at Bull Run Followed by Three Years of Marches, Manuevers and Terrible Encounters.

The grand maneuvers on the plains of Manassas, which begin in a few days, attract general attention to a section which at one time was of the most supreme interest to the people of the United States. For three years the Plains of Manassas were the scene of mighty movements and awful battles by great armies, and the news was waited from day to day with interest so intense as to be almost sickening.

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
TO BENEFIT ALL

The National Tribune's plan to aid widows is intended to benefit all comrades. Subscribers should explain it to those who are not subscribers.


back to Winchester, where they could at once oppose any further advance of the Union troops, be ready to attack the latter if they were diminished in strength, and, if successful, could march directly on and take Washington. At the same time they could, if necessary, go quickly to the assistance of their comrades at Manassas.

FIRST MOVEMENTS. The troops gathered in Washington were immediately pushed out to occupy Arlington Heights, which commanded the city from the Virginia side. As soon as Virginia, under the pressure of the troops sent in from the Cotton States, voted to secede, another column was set forward to occupy Alexandria, during which operation Col. Ellsworth was killed.

This gave the Union troops possession of the south side of the Potomac in an irregular line running from the heights above Georgetown to Alexandria. This with the heights around Harper's Ferry and the ground immediately around Fort Monroe were all of the present State of Virginia under the control of the Union army. President Lincoln's call for 75,000 men had been responded to by 31,000 men. Under the law they could be done for but three months, and their time would begin to expire after the middle of July. A large portion of them were militia companies, the members of which had responded to the call at considerable personal loss and inconvenience. Their natural desire was to do something decisive before



SKETCH OF BATTLE OF ATLANTA.



THE PLAINS OF MANASSAS.

Practical Results Already:

Although The National Tribune's plan to aid widows was first announced only a few weeks since, it is already of practical, almost daily, assistance to widows. It is the plain duty of every married comrade to attend to this matter.

Preliminary Report

To aid my widow, if I leave one, in getting her pension.

NOTE.—This report is short and can be easily written out on letter or legal cap paper. This course avoids cutting the paper. If uncertain as to some of the dates, leave them blank. Dates of marriage, ages, etc., are more important than dates of service. When report is ready, mail it to THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, Washington, D. C.

Date _____, 1904.

(Write above number and street, or R. F. D. No., if any.)

Soldier's Name _____ Present P. O. _____

State _____ I was in the service from _____ day of _____, 186____, to _____ day of _____, 186____, as a _____ (Give rank, also company and regiment.)

and was honorably discharged at _____, on the _____ day of _____, 186____. Are you a pensioner? _____ At what rate? \$ _____ per month. (Yes or no.)

Were you pensioned under the old law or the new? _____ (The new law is the act of June 27, 1902.)

What wounds, diseases or disabilities, if any, are written on your pension certificate? _____

I was married to _____ on the _____ day of _____, 18____, by _____ (Give name of clergyman or person officiating.) at _____

At marriage my age was _____ Her age was _____

Is there a court or church record of this marriage? _____

Were either of you previously married? _____

If a prisoner of war, state for how long _____

Remarks: _____